Washington DC: In August, Elon Musk shared DogeDesigner's X post 'India needs @Starlink' with the comment: 'Starlink would help the least served in India, especially in rural areas.' By October, the SpaceX boss went all turbo, accusing Indian 'oligarchs' of blocking Starlink's entry into the country to protect a 'monopolistic chokehold'.

Musk may be right about Starlink connecting India's 'least served' regions. But India's satcom debate has narrowed to a pricing exercise: whether spectrum should cost 4% or 5% of AGR, what urban users should pay extra, how long assignments should run.... These numbers matter for operators' margins. But there's a bigger question: which bloc will Indian skies belong to?

The low-Earth-orbit (LEO) sky is being divided. SpaceX has reportedly more than 11,000 operational Starlink satellites in LEO, and plans tens of thousands more. China is building two state-backed networks, Guowang and Qianfan, each designed for well over 10,000 satellites. Amazon is next.

Within a decade, most of the world's satellite broadband will come from a handful of US and Chinese networks. The Cold War sorted nations by who supplied their weapons. This contest may sort them by who supplies their connectivity.

Physics makes this market unlike any other. LEO - between 160 km and 2,000 km above Earth's surface - is finite. Satellites must keep safe distances, fly at particular altitudes, and share a limited band of radio frequencies. Under international rules, the best altitudes and frequencies go largely to whoever files and launches first. In economic terms, this is a market with a first-mover advantage written into the laws of nature, and very high barriers to late entry.

An economist would spot a second feature at once: switching costs. A satellite dish is built for one constellation. Once a country's schools, banks, hospitals, ports and armed forces are wired into one network, leaving it means replacing every terminal and gateway. That is vendor lock-in at national scale. It is how a commercial choice hardens into strategic dependence. Pricing power follows. A supplier that cannot be replaced has little reason to discount.

India's bargaining position is unusual. It's the largest market Starlink has yet to enter, a space power with its own launchers, and a credible voice for the 'global south'. But that leverage is perishable. Once services are live and terminals installed, it declines fast. It should be used now, and for more than better tariff.

History offers a precedent few remember. In 1976, 8 equatorial nations signed the Bogota Declaration, claiming the geostationary orbit above their territory. The legal claim failed, but the politics worked. Pressure from developing countries helped push International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to guarantee every nation access to slots and frequencies in that orbit, including nations that could not yet launch. Latecomers were protected by rules, not rockets. LEO has no such protection today.

A non-aligned satcom policy could comprise of 3 measures:

Constellation portability: Mobile number portability, rolled out nationally in 2011, did more for competition in Indian telecom than many tariff orders, because it made switching cheap. Satcom needs the same principle.

Licence conditions should require interoperable gateways, and encourage terminals that can work with more than one network. And where government subsidises user terminals in remote areas, as the regulator has recommended, public money should only buy equipment that keeps the user free to switch. A subsidy that deepens lock-in is a poor use of the exchequer.

'Bogota' for low orbit: India should lead an ITU coalition for reserved, equitable access to LEO altitudes and frequencies for countries that cannot yet launch. The developing world won a share of the geostationary arc 50 yrs ago. It can win a share of the low sky now, but only before that sky fills up.

Indian network for export: In 2017, India launched South Asia Satellite (Gsat-9) and offered it to its neighbours. That idea should now become business. Isro, NewSpace India Ltd (NSIL) and private firms can build a modest constellation open to partners across South Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean region.

It needn't match Starlink in scale. Its value lies in giving partners - and India itself - a second supplier. For Indian space startups, a sovereign anchor customer of this kind would do more than any one-time grant.

None of this argues for keeping Starlink out. Non-aligned India bought arms from many countries and became hostage to none. It can buy connectivity the same way. Competition among constellations will serve Indian consumers and businesses better than dependence on any single one, US or Chinese.

The decision before New Delhi is usually framed as whether to let Musk in, and at what price. It should be whether India becomes one more customer of someone else's sky, or the market that sets fair terms for everyone's.